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SECTION 3(5)(i) OF THE COMPETITION
ACT- AN ANALYSIS
-Paramjeet

Berwal

Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.
Edmund Burke (1729-1797)
There is economy.' There are people.2 There are conflicting interests and priorities.3 Then, there is competition in the system. Law is the only tool in the hands
5
of the state to manufacture and sustain any system.
With the Kataria6 judgment rendered by the Competition Commission of
India interpreting some of the most important aspects relating to Section 3(5)
(i) of the Competition Act, it is crucial for the different stakeholders to analyse
this decision, which would affect competition, innovation and consumer welfare.
The aim of this article is to analyse and understand the scope and the nature of

2

Karl Marx referred to the economic structure of the society as the real foundation on which legal
and political superstructure arises. Karl Marx, Preface to A CONTRIBUTION To THE CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Moscow, Progress Publishers Moscow 1977).
Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy in General, in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
MANUSCRIPT OF 1844 ("That is to say, the objects of his [man's] instincts exist outside him, as
objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs - essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers."); In order to under-

stand the contemporary change in human behavior, see Robert D. Putman,
3

4

5

6

BOWLING ALONE: THE

AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (New York, Simon and Schuster 2000).
Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach And The End Of Classical German Philosophy, 4 & 5 Die
Neue Zeit part 4, (1886) ("That which is willed happens but rarely; in the majority of instances
the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from
the outset incapable of realisation, or the means of attaining them are insufficient. Thus the conflict of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produce a
state of affairs entirely analogous to that prevailing in the realm of unconscious nature.").
See John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney and R. Jamil Jonna, Monopoly and Competition
in the Twenty-First Century Capitalism, 62(11) MONTHLY REVIEW (April, 2011); see also Maurice
E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?,1(1) J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 162,162 (2013).
Though, recently, the studies have proved that it really is the economically affluent people who
influence the law-making. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12(03) Perspectives on Politics, 564, 575577 (2014).
Shamsher Kataria,In re, 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 95 ("Kataria").
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relationship between Intellectual Property and Competition Law from a purely
legal perspective entailing economic and social dimensions. It discusses questions arising in relation to the interpretation of Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition
Act; the interpretation afforded to the same by the Competition Commission;
and other possible permutations and combinations that might serve the purpose
behind the enactment of the said provision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prof John F. Duffy 7 claims that competition law structures intellectual property rights.8 Whereas, the Competition Commission of India (henceforth referred
to as "CCI") has maintained that intellectual property rights lessen competition.9 The legislation does provide a mechanism to achieve the purpose set therein.'0 The application of competition law to the cases, predominantly, pertaining
to intellectual property rights is considered to be an extremely complicated and
critical issue of competition policy." This, perhaps, is the reason that, entrusted
with the responsibility of formulating National IPR Policy, the IPR Think-Tank
of India has listed IP interface with Competition law and policy in the important
areas of study and research for future policy developments. 2 The Committee for
framing the National Competition Policy of India also enlists intellectual prop3
erty laws as having one of the most important interfaces with the competition.
Competition and intellectual property rights are very distinct issues, yet they
form very intrinsic aspects of an economic system which is controlled by certain
laws. 4

Prof. John F. Duffy is Samuel H. McCoy Professor of Law and Armistead M. Dobie Professor of
Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
John F. Duffy's comments at National Lawyers Convention organized by The Intellectual
Property Practice Group of The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, November
14, 2013, YouTUBE (Nov. 15, 2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-TmBJknoGKSM; see also
Shubha Ghosh, Intellectual PropertyLaw and Competition, International Scholars Conference on
Intellectual Property Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, 16 -17h September,, 2014.
9 Competition Commission of India, Advocacy Booklet, Intellectual Property Rights Under the
Competition Act, 2002".
10 Paramjeet
Singh Berwal, Articles 3(a) and 3(b) of the SPC Regulation - An Analysis, 36(1)
7

EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW, 29, 33 (2014).
JOSEPH DREXL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW (Edward

12
13

14

Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008); Jaoquin Almunia, Vice President, European Commission
Responsible for the Competition Policy, Speech at the IP Summit, Paris: Intellectual Property
and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013).
National IPR Policy submitted by IPR Think Tank, First Draft, at p. 23, (19th December 2014).
Draft National Competition Policy Statement of India- 2011, drafted by the Committee constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.
This is true even in the case of 'free-market economy' because there is no such thing as a free
market. In fact, this is the very first truth Ha Joon Chang, Reader in the Political Economy of
Development at Cambridge University, reveals in one of his books. He writes that every market
has some rules and government is always involved. Ha-Joon Chang, 23 THINGS THEY DON'T TELL
You ABOUT CAPITALISM (Allen Lane ed., London, Penguin, 2010).
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MEANING AND PURPOSE
According to WIPO, "[I]ntellectual Property (IP) refers to creations of the
mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; design; and symbols, names
15
and images used in commerce."
The concerned international organisations highlight the purpose of IPRs as
private economic benefits accruing to IPR holders 6 . WIPO states that "[I]ntellectual property rights are like any other property right. They allow creators, or
owners, of patents, trademarks or copyrighted works to benefit from their own
work or investment in creation. These rights are outlined in Article 27 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides for the right to benefit
from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from authorship of
scientific, literary or artistic productions."'17 Per the WTO, "they usually give the
creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creation for a certain period of
time."" According to OECD, "[T]hese property rights allow the holder to exercise
a monopoly on the use of the item for a specified period. By restricting imitation
and duplication, monopoly power is conferred, but the social costs of monopoly
may be 9 offset by the social benefits of higher level of creative activity encouraged by monopoly earnings."2 They are the rewards that an individual get for his
efforts.2'

15

16

WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en!.
IP holders can include people and corporations. However, corporations hold more IPRs than

people do. See 1 Wenche Barth Eide (Ed.) & Uwe Kracht (Ed.), FOOD

AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
434 (Intersentia 2005).
What is Intellectual Property?, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo pub 450.pdf.
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/intell e.htm.
The phrase 'may be' is very crucial in the context of understanding the importance of IPRs in
DEVELOPMENT - LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS AND SELECTED TOPIcs

19

serving a larger interest, directly or indirectly.
R.S. Khemani & D.M. Shapiro, Glossary of Industrial OrganisationEconomics and Competition
Law, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD (1993).
21 Cf Justin Huges, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property Rights, 77 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
20

287 (1988) (citing, Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., 53 L Ed 2d 965 : 433 US 562,
576 (1977) "The protection [of publicity] provides an economic incentive ... to make the investment required to produce a performance ....
This same consideration underlies the patent and
copyright laws long enforced by this Court."; Goldstein v. California, 37 L Ed 2d 163 : 412 US
546, 555 (1973) "to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation,
Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward"; cf. United States v. Paramount
Pictures Loew's, 92 L Ed 1260 : 334 US 131, 158 (1948) "It is said that reward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.").
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IPRs are private rights.22 The business houses across the world are increasingly becoming dependent on IPRs for profit-making.23 Though many claim
that IPRs act as incentive to innovate 24, others say that they are merely a tool to
commercialise the innovation that would have been there, sooner or later, even
if there were no IPRs. 25 It is also often said that IPRs are ultimately directed
towards the welfare of consumers. 26 Theories should be tested by the utilities they
27
afford in explaining the practical situations occurring in reality.
III. COMPETITION LAW - MEANING AND PURPOSE
"Competition law provides the framework for competitive activity. It protects
the process of competition." 28 The concept of competition in the market is considered valuable and, therefore, worthy of being protected. 29 It is argued that competition in international and domestic markets provides an impetus to efficiency and
productivity by letting survive and sustain only those firms that are better than
the others in terms of catering to the demands of the market.30 The competition
law seeks to protect competition in the market encouraging innovation 3' and promoting price competition 3 233
. Consumer welfare and protection is considered to be
34
the goal of the competition law.
22

Keith Eugene Maskus,

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS:

THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 21ST CENTURY (Washington, DC, Peterson Institute Press 2012); LTC
Harms, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Case Book, (WIPO, 3rd ed. 2012);

23
24

2
26

Christopher May, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS- THE NEW
ENCLOSURES? (London, Routledge 2000).
William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY (Cambridge University Press 2001).
Sunil Kanwar and Robert E. Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur Technological
Change, Center Discussion Paper No. 831, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, at p. 18
(June 2001) available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth pdf/cdpS3l.pdf.
See Innovation and Growth Rationalefor an Innovation Strategy, OECD, 10 (2007).
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE LAW JOURNAL1575 (2002).
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Aspen, 8th
ed, 2011).
Competition Bill (H.L.), H L Deb October 30, 1997, Volume 582 Column 1156.
Sandra Marco Colino, INTRODUCTION To COMPETITION LAW (Oxford University Press, 7th ed. 2011).
Klaus Schwab, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2014-15 (World Economic Forum 2014).
This is called 'dynamic competition'.

27 See
28
29
30
31

This is called 'static competition'.
3 Richard Whish, COMPETITION LAW (London, LexisNexis UK,
32

5th

edn. 2003) 734; Thomas Dreier,

Balancing Proprietory and Public domain Interests: Inside or Outside of ProprietaryRights?,
EXPANDING

14

THE BOUNDARIES

OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY:

INNOVATION

POLICY FOR

THE KNOWLEDGE

SOCIETY (Rochelle, Cooper, Dreyfuss, et al eds. 2001) 312; Herbet Hovenkamp, et al, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (New
York, Aspen Law & Business, 2002).
See Bork, R.H. (1978), The Antitrust Paradox: A policy at War with Itself, Basic Books; Posner,
R.A. (2001), Antitrust Law, University of Chicago Press, 21 edition; Competition Policy and Law
in the Consumer and Development Interest, Dr. S. Sothi Rachagan, United nations Conference on
Trade and Development 2-4 July 2003 p. 4 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/sothi.pdf
; Some Reflections on the Question of Goals of EU Competition Law, Joannis Lianos, January
2013, Centre for Law Economics and Society Working Paper Series, 3/2013; On the Choice of
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Generally, this, that the IPRs and Competition law seek to achieve consumer
welfare, is what the mainstream organisation and experts around the world propose.3 5 IPRs act as an incentive to innovate and, thereafter, cause their dissemination and commercialization.3 6 On the other hand, competition laws promote
innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting anti-competitive practices with
regard to the existing and the new ways of serving consumers. 37 However, the
text that immediately follows the definitions of IPRs as provided by various international organizations like WIPO, WTO, OECD etc.38 clearly highlights economic
or financial significance of IPRs for the IPR holders and not for the consumers. In
the absence of any strong evidence3 9, attributing consumer welfare 40 to IPRs can
be said to be merely a distorted hindsight approach in a desperate attempt to jus4
tify IPRs in the context of overall consumer welfare. '
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP
Competition law is a legal framework of market supervision that seeks to
correct the problem of monopoly which is one kind of a market failure. 42 On
the other hand, IPRs grant monopoly rights to the IPR holders. 43 Earlier it was
Welfare Standards in the Competition Law, Louis Kaplow, Discussion Paper No. 693, Harvard
Law School May 2011.
15

36

38

See Arutyun Arutyunyan, Intellectual Property Law vs. Essential Facility Doctrine. Microsoft
vs. Commission, BALITIC JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES (earlier known as the Proceedings of the

Institute for European Studies), IES Proceedings, No. 4 (December 2008), Socio-Economic and
Institutional Environment: Harmonisation in the EU Countries of Baltic Sea Rim.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH); also see United Nation
Economic Commission for Europe; Intellectual Property Commercialisation - Policy Options and
Practical Instruments 2011 esp. p. 6.
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH).
Refer to the discussion under the heading "Intellectual Property - meaning and purpose" of this
article.

39 See Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploration of Some Issues of

Relevance to Developing Countries, ICTSD IPRs and Sustainable Development Programme Issue
Paper No. 21, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland,
40
41

at p. viii.
For more information about the realities of IPRs, read Joseph Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of
Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 1693 (2008).
To know more about the basics of such issues, see Doron Teichman, The Hindsight Bias and the
Law in the Hindsight, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW,

354-376 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., Oxford University Press 2014); see also Ellsworth,
42

Phoebe C., Legal Reasoning and Scientific Reasoning, 63(1) Alabama Law Review , 895 (2011).
Niamh Dunne, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION - MAKING AND MANAGING MARKETS

14 (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
41

See Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or

Monopoly? 13(3) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 911, 911 (1990); N. Stephan Kinsella,
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 6 (Ludwog von Mises Institute, 2008); Steven Shavell and
Tanguy Van Ypersel, Abstract to Rewards vs. Intellectual Property Rights, 44 JOURNAL OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 525 (2001); for another point of view, see John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property
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believed that the two disciplines operate against each other.44 But the perception is considered to have changed now with a prevailing mindset that the goals
of competition law and intellectual property are similar.45 But the pseudo-shift
in the academic discourse is a common consequence of the conditioning of the
academia by the existing power structures. 46 There is one school of thought that
seeks to separate the competition law from the intellectual property law and
maintains that the job of the competition law should only be limited to the "use
and abuse of property rights that are sources of monopoly power ' 47.
An argument is often advanced against subjecting the IPRs to competition
scrutiny that it will undermine the very certainty of the exclusivity that intellectual property rights aim to provide in order to stimulate innovation. 4 The protection of IPRs from the onslaught of competition law presumes the relevance of
JPRs in stimulating innovation that is considered to be the best for the public.
Recouping of investment is helped by IP regime and therefore, firms are incentivized to innovate. 49 The veracity of this argument has to be tested through the
sieve of the obscenities of truth. It is argued that innovation has been and will
always be there irrespective of the existence of IPRs5 0 There exist contradictory
approaches in this regard.5 These different approaches not only create confusions
as Natural Monopoly: Towards a General Theory of PartialProperty Rights, Paper at Fall 2004

Workshop of the Center of Law, Business, and Economics of the University of Texas.
44 See, eg, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F 3d 1195, 1215 ( th Cir 1997)
9

("[o]ne body of law creates and protects monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it.').
Games Corpn. v. Nintendo of America Inc, 897 F 2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Thomas C.

45 Atari

Vinje and Ashwin van Rooijen, Chapter 17: The Relationship between Intellectual Property
Rights and Competition Laws, in OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 368 (Neil Wilkof
& Shamnad Basheer eds., Oxford University Press 2012); The competition law/IP 'interface'- an
introductory note, in

THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION

POLICY 1 (Steven D Anderman ed., Cambridge University Press 2007); William K Tom & Joshua
A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field,
66 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 167, 167 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, A New balance between IP and
Antitrust, 13 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 237 (2007).
46 See Interview with Ha Joon Chang, Reader, University of Cambridge, Old economics, new stir1

rings, FRONTLINE (March 6, 2015).
Pierre Regibeau & Katherine Rockett, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and

Competition Law: An Economic Approach, Discussion Paper, University of Essex and CEPR
(June 2014).
41 See Ashwin van Rooijen, THE SOFT WARE INTERFACE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAWS, 104
(Kluver Law International, 2010).
49 Commission Notice Guidelines on the application of the Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, European Commission, 7 Section Official Journal C-101/2 (2004).
5o Friedrich A. Hayek, THE FATAL CONCEIT- THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 6 (W.W. Bartely, 3rd ed.,
Chicago, University of Chicago press, 1991); see Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 839; S.N.S. Cheung,

Property Rights and Invention, 8 Res. L. & Econ. 5, 6 (1986) (referring to F.W. Taussig,
Inventors and Money-Makers (1930)); see generally Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From
Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual
51

Property (New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers- 478, 2014).
Padraig Dixon & Christine Greenhalgh, The Economics of Intellectual Property: A Review to
Identify Themes for Future Research, at p. 31, University of Oxford, Discussion Paper Serious

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REV. (2015)

as to the real understanding of the issue from an unbiased point of view, they
enrich the public discourse by making available plethora of perspectives.
V. INTERFACE BETWEEN THE IP AND
COMPETITION LAW- GIVING IT A SHAPE
In the Indian context, as is everywhere else in the world, any philosophical
conundrum is put an end to, at least, in the realm of justice dispensation system, the moment a piece of legislation on the subject comes into the picture. The
same happened with the controversies that arose from the interaction between
competition policy and IPRs when many countries around the world passed
laws pertaining to the competition law. 52 However, thereafter, further problems
of interpretation of the law started to crop up.5 3 Though the broader question is
"whether and under which conditions the granting of IP protection may be limited, or whether an appropriate market regime- in the light of pursuing innovation- could be established on the basis of competition law" 54 , the relationship
between the two and the formal protocol governing the same have been concretised by Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act. Regardless, it is crucial to understand the nature and the scope of this relationship as has come to be defined by
55
the statute.
In a common law country that India is, it becomes important to take into
account the apprehensions that attach to any exercise of interpretation 56 undertaken by the courts, especially when the laws hailing from different disciplines
come into conflict with each other at the time of their application. The significance of the dilemma intensifies in the absence of any formal hierarchy in the
legal statutory structure. 57 It is very difficult to say whether Competition Law
will prevail over IP law or vice-versa; and, how will the competition law deal
No. 135 (December 2002).
52 R. Shyam Khemani, Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exemptions, UNCTAD/

DITC/CLP/Misc.25 (United Nations, 2002); For an overview of the competition laws around the
world, see Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of
the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effect, 74(2) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 271 (2007).
53 Roger van den Bergh & Peter D. Camesasca, EUROPEAN COMPETITIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS: A
51

n
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 70 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2 ed. 2006).
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Intellectual property law and competition

law- between the market place and the regulation, http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/research teach-

ing/ip/fields of research/marketplace and regulation.cfm#i26297.
55 See Jens Schovsbo, Fire and Water Make Steam- redefining the role of competition law in

TRIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM (Annette Kur ed., Edward
Elgar Publication, 2011).
56 Lord Selborne, L.C., in Giles v. Melsom, 1873 LRHL Eng. Ir. App. 24, said that "that nothing
can be more mischievous than the attempt to wrest words from their proper and legal meaning,

only because they are superfluous".
57 Grosse

Ruse-Khan, Henning, Introduction to A Conflict-of laws Approach to Competing
Rationalities in InternationalLaw: The Case of Plain Packaging between IP, Trade, Investment
and Health, 9 JOURNAL OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 309 ( 2013).
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with IP issues.5 8 The Competition Commission of India (henceforth referred to as
"CCI") in Shamsher Kataria, In re59 did deal with the interpretation of Section
3(5)(i) of the Competition Act. The following discussion will conclude into
whether the way CCI dealt with the issue clarified the situation or obscured it
further and that too in a wrong direction.
VI. SECTION 3(5)(I) OF THE COMPETITION ACT
Regardless of the fact that IP regimes should not be conceived and applied in
isolation to the competition law60 , the existing IP laws do not protect competition.
There is an argument that IP law promotes dynamic competition.6' But, doubts do
exist whether IPRs should take all the credit for being the champion of dynamic
competition.62
There is absolutely no reference to the term "competition" in the India IP statutes. But, the competition law statute provides certain exemptions to protect the
IPRs.63 Any person who wants to go ahead with restraining someone else from
infringing his IPRs or with imposing certain restriction in order to protect his
IPRs under the Indian statutes has been given a free pass under the Competition
Act. This implies that the overall mandate of the legal system is biased in favour
of IPRs that are private rights, at the cost of competition law, the most desired
general market phenomenon.64 Therefore, the objectives that are sought to be
served by the application of IPR laws are given preference and priority over the
objectives that are sought to be served by the application of competition law.
Section 3(5)(i) of the Act reads as follows:
51 See Copyright, Competition and Development, A Report By Max Planck Institute for Intellectual

51

Property and Competition Law, Munich, at p. 6 (December 2013), http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/
pdf3/Report Copy right-Competition-D evelopment December-2013.pdf.
Shamsher Kataria,In re, 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 95.

60

Carlos Correa, A Competition Approach to the Intellectual Property Protection, International

Center for Trade and Development (November 1, 2007) available at http://www.ictsd.org/
bridge s-news/bridges/new s/a-competition-approach-to -intellectual-property-protection.
61

Josef Drexl, Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law- IMS Health and Trinko- Antitrust Placebo
for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-To-Deal Cases', 35 IIC: International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 788, 802-et sq (2004); RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW,

16 (Joseph Drexl ed., Edward Elgar

Publishing Limited 2008); see also Josef Drexl, Do we always favor dynamic competition over
static price competition when excluding Imitation?, Presentation, 13th EIPIN Congress (March 3,
2012).
62 See Keith E. Maskus, Conlcusion to Intellectual Property Rights And Economic Development,

63
64

Prepared for the series "Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International
Intellectual Property Law", organized by Fredrick K. Cox International Law Center at Case
Western Reserve University (Revised Draft: February 6, 2000).
Section 3(5)(i), The Competition Act, 2002.
"The existence of IP rights restricts competitive market forces for a set period.", IP Australia,
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/understanding-intellectual-property/why-use-ip/value-of-ip-rights/.
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(5) Nothing contained in this section shall restrict
(i) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of or to impose
reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his
rights which have been or may be conferred upon him under
(a) the CopyrightAct, 1957 (14 of 1957);
(b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970);
(c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the
Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999);
(d) the Geographical Indications of Goods
Protection)Act, 1999 (48 of 1999);

(Registration and

(e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000);
(/) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000
(37 of 2000);
The section regulates the effect of competition law on IPRs and is positive in
nature in the sense that it is only when the situation 5 stated therein emerges that
the competition law, though not failing to follow its due course, will not bother
to restrict the happening of the said situation. 66 However, this is not true.67 The
section will come into play only if the application of the Competition Act will
restrict the right6 of a person to restrain infringement of and to impose conditions for protecting his rights 69 that have been or may be conferred upon him
under the specific IP statutes 70 mentioned therein.
Thus, technically, it is not the IPRs as such that are protected by the virtue of
Section 3(5)(i); rather, it is the right to protect IPRs that is protected. 7 ' The right

The 'situation', here, refers to what has been provided for in the Section 3(5)(i) of the
Competition Act.
66 This highlights how the way a law is written serves the purpose that it doesn't expressly seek to
serve.
6 The following sections of the article will highlight and explain the point.
68 The words used in the section are "the right" of a person. It means that the section is talking of a
particular right.
69 Here and until this stage of the flow of the section 3(5)(i), the Competition Act is referring to the
IPRs in a general sense. It is yet not talking about the source of these rights.
o Here, it becomes clear that the rights that are sought to be protected by the right that is allowed
unrestricted by the Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act are the IPRs that have been or may be
conferred by the IP Statutes specifically mentioned therein.
71 But, this is merely a technicality of the language of section 3(5)(i). The consequence of the operation of this section is inherently linked to the substance of the section.
65
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that is unrestricted by the operation of this section is, in fact, the right to exer7
cise 72 the IPRs. 1
VII. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
'EXISTENCE AND 'EXERCISE' OF IPRS - A
COMPETITION LAW PERSPECTIVE
The section is supposedly not meant to afford a blanket exemption to IPRs
under the Competition Act, 2002. Rather, it demarcates the operational boundary
between competition law and IPRs where the transaction in question entails both
aspects.

7
1

Interestingly, CCI observes that existence of IPRs does not automatically
include the right to exert restrictive or monopoly power in a market. 71 It further, categorically, notes that a practical solution can be based on the distinction between the existence of IPRs and their exercise. 76 Therefore, according to
CCI, if the exercise of IPRs leads to any prohibited anti-competitive trade practice, the same has to be assailed.77 This stance of CCI is totally against what the
Competition Act's Section 3(5)(i) puts forth. The said provision, in fact, takes the
exercise of the IPRs out of the domain of application of the Competition Act.
Per Section 3(5)(i), a person has a right to protect the rights that have been
or may be conferred upon him under the specific IP statutes mentioned therein.78 This he can do by restraining infringement of his IPRs or imposing certain
conditions as may be necessary for the protection of his IPRs. IPRs are, generally 7 9 , considered to be negative right i.e. the right to stop the third parties from
their commercial exploitation. The existence of IPRs, the negative rights, is the
exercise 0 of the IPRs. Therefore, if one is trying to do any of the two things
- restraining infringement of IPRs or imposing conditions to protect them72 The right to exercise IPRs, here, refers to the right to do the things that come under the charac-

terization of the IPRs as negative rights.
73 It is the right to exercise IPRs that the CCI's official Advocacy Booklet on Intellectual Property

Rights claims to assailed if the same goes contrary to the principles of competition.
I The legislative realities reflect the proposition.
75 CCI Advocacy Booklet Intellectual Property Rights under the Competition Act, 2002.
76 Id.
I Supra note 74.
71 For the sake of brevity, let the rights, both, the conferred and those that may be conferred, be
called IPRs.
79 There are a few academicians who really think that the IPRs being considered as negative rights
is a matter of hyper-technicality that crops up from the language of the statutory instruments. In
my opinion, IPRs are positive rights when we notice the purpose they serve and the functions
they have when they are in operation.
80 Canada Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau, Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines,
paragraph 4.2.1 ("The Bureau defines the mere exercise of an IP right as the exercise of the owner's right to unilaterally exclude others from using the IP. The Bureau views an IP owner's use of
the IP also as being the mere exercise of an IP right.").
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mentioned in the section, one is deemed to be exercising his IPRs.' Therefore,
section 3(5)(i) takes away the IPRs and their exercise completely from the domain
of competition law; and, this scenario contradicts what has been claimed by CCI
in its IPR advocacy booklet.
VIII. SCOPE OF THE PROTECTIONWHAT IS PROTECTED?
As we have seen, the right that has not been allowed to be restricted by virtue
of Section 3(5)(i) is only the right to restrain the infringement of or to impose
certain restrictions to protect rights that have been conferred or may be conferred
by the IP statutes; and, not the rights conferred or that may be conferred by the
IP statutes itself. Technically, a person has a right to restrain infringement as
per the IP statute. Therefore, for a moment, the use of 'the' before 'right' can be
taken to mean that the right that is sought to be unrestricted is something that
has been borrowed from the IP statutes by the Competition Act. But, what the
language of the section provides for is not this. Though the operation of the section seeks to address the issue of exercise of IPRs and does recognize a very specific right82 to restrain infringement and impose conditions, the language of the
section is silent about the source of the said right.
IX. POSITION OF IPRS UNDER SECTION 3(5)(1)
What rights can be protected by exercising the right that is allowed unrestricted under the section have been left to the specific IP statutes by using an
arrangement of words "have been or may be conferred upon him under" in the
section. According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the meaning of "conferred" is "to give (as property or characteristic) to someone or something". It
implies that even if certain rights can, generally, be termed as "IPRs", they will
not be, for the purpose of this section, as long as they have not been or may not
be conferred under the specific IP statutes mentioned therein. Only the 'conferment' has been subjected to the specific IP statutes. The subject matter - "any
of his rights" - in relation to which infringement can be restrained and the reasonable conditions can be imposed is rooted in the IP statutes. Hence, per the
8

Illustration: In case of patents, the section 48 of the Patents Act provides for the right of the

patentee and the same include the exclusive right to prevent third parties, who do not have his
consent, from the act of making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes.
Therefore, restraining the infringement of the patent rights under the Patents Act will include not
allowing third parties to make, use, etc. the product that is the subject matter of the patent. The
restraining the infringement is, thus, the exercise of the IPRs as the IPRs are negative rights.
Therefore, technically, only restraining the infringement would amount to exercising the IPRs.
If the IPRs were positive rights, then their use by the IPR holder to produce his own goods and
services would have constituted exercise of IPRs. But, the later is not the case.
82 By using "the" before "right" in the language of Section 3(5)(i).
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structuring of the section 3(5)(1), the list of the specific IP statutes mentioned in
the section has a very limited purpose.
X. INFRINGEMENT
Infringement, though not defined but provided for in the IP statutes, allows an
IPR holder exercise his negative rights. Therefore, if the 'infringement' of IPRs
in the context of the Competition Act is considered to mean what the infringement is in the context of IP statutes, the right to restrain infringement will be
considered to be a negative right for that is what the IPRs are generally taken as.
However, per the language of section 3(5)(i), the right to restrain infringement is
not, in the context of the application of the section, rooted to the IP statutes.
XI. IMPOSING REASONABLE CONDITIONS
Another aspect that is covered by the unrestricted right allowed under the section is the right of an individual to impose certain restrictions to protect IPRs.
Normally, imposition of reasonable terms and conditions are expected by the IP
statutes to be imposed in the context of licensing of IPRs. But, as is clear from
the language of section 3(5)(i), the Section here is not specifically talking about
those reasonable conditions. Therefore, the second subject matter of the right i.e.
imposition of reasonable condition is also not rooted in the IP statutes.
The basis of the aforementioned observations is that if the legislative intent
was to ground the underlying purpose of everything contained in Section 3(5)(i)
in the specific IP statutes mentioned therein, the language would have expressly
provided for the same and the phrases like "may be conferred" and "imposition
of reasonable conditions" would have been excluded. The syntax of the provision categorically puts forth that the Competition Law did not want to put the
IP Statutes totally out of the application of competition law; rather, it wanted
to provide for its own arrangement pertaining to IPRs that it thought should be
excluded from the Competition Act's application.
XII. DISCUSSING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF KATARIA CASE
In the case, CCI noted that the Original Equipment Manufacturers (henceforth
referred to as "OEMs") relied on Section 3(5)(i) to state that the restrictions on
Original Equipment Suppliers (henceforth referred to as "OESs") with regard to
sales of the OEMs' proprietary parts to third parties without prior consent would
fall within the ambit of reasonable condition to prevent infringement of their
IPRs. 3 The investment function of IPRs was also raised by the OEMs.8 4 They,
13
84

Supra note 6,
Supra note 6,

20.6.15.
20.6.15.
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according to CCI, contended that investment in research and development facili85
ties by them lead to manufacturing of the products in question.
CCI in order to determine whether the agreements entered between the OEMs
and OESs fell within the ambit of the provisions of Section 3(5)(i) of the Act
thought it necessary to frame the following for considerations:
"a) whether the right which is put forward is correctly characterized as protecting an intellectual property; and
b) whether the requirements of the law granting the IPRs are in fact being
86
satisfied."
A. 'have been or may be granted' - Interpretation
CCI took into consideration the failure on the part of the OEMs to confirm
the status of the IPRs held by them in India along with necessary details to support their contention that Section 3(5)(i) is applicable to their case.1 There was
no documentary evidence afforded by the OEMs to establish the grant of IPRs in
relation to their spare parts, in India.88
According to CCI, the applications of Section 3(5)(i) was consequent upon the
fulfilment of the condition that IPRs have been conferred or may be conferred
upon the "IPR holder".89 It observed that: "The Commission isof the opinion
under section 3(5)(i) allows an IPR holder to impose reasonable restrictions
to protect his rights 'which have been or may be conferred upon him under'
the specified JPR statutes mentioned therein. The statute is clear in its requirement that an JPR must have been conferred (or may be conferred) upon the IPR
holder prior to the exception under section 3(5)(i) being available. Therefore,
before the OEIVs are permitted to seek the exemption under section 3(5)(i) they
must establish that their JPRs have been grantedprotection (or that the OEMs
have initiated the process of being granted protection) under the specified JPR
statutes in India".[Emphasis Added]
While interpreting 'which have been or may be conferred upon him under',
CCI concluded that either the OEMS should prove that either their IPRs have
been granted protection or the OEMs have initiated the process of being granted
protection under the specified IP statutes in India".

86
8

Supra note 6, 20.6.15; It is not understandable what relevance the investment function of IPRs
has in the context of application of Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act.
Supra note 6, 20.6.16.
Supra note 6, at 20.6.16.

8 Supra note 6, at 20.6.16.
89 Supra note 6, at
20.6.16.
90 CCI imposed the geographical limitation on the characterisation of certain rights as IPRs, though
the relevant section was silent on this.
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This observation is marred by the following two interpretational faults:
First, the word that has been used by CCI is the "IPR holder" which is totally
absent from the language of Section 3(5)(i). Can a person upon whom the rights
under a specific IPR statute have not yet been conferred and may be conferred
be called an 'IPR holder'? No. A person becomes an IPR holder only after the
rights have been conferred upon him under the specific IP law. 9' The issue under
consideration here is not whether the IP has been registered for the creator or the
owner to be declared as an IPR holder; the issue is whether IPRs have been conferred upon a person by the application of any specific IP statute.
Second, CCI mistook the right that "may be conferred" to mean that the
party seeking application of Section 3(5)(i) should have initiated the process of
being granted protection. This interpretation is inherently wrong as it provides
no line of thinking or argument that made CCI interpret "the right that may be
conferred" into "therefore, before the OEMs are permitted to seek the exemption
under Section 3(5)(i) they must establish that their IPRs have been granted protection (or that the OEMs have initiated the process of being granted protection) under the specified IPR statutes in India." [Emphasis applied] The Section
does not, in any way, require that the person evoking Section 3(5)(i) must have
initiated the process of being granted the protection under the IP statute to bring
his rights under the purview of "may be conferred". The language of the provision does cover a situation in which certain rights under the specific IP statutes
may be conferred upon a person even if he hasn't applied for it. It is not a procedural requirement; rather, it is a substantial requirement, in the context of the
Competition Act.

92

XIII. LACK OF EVIDENCE
CCI also differed from OEMs in relation to the latter's characterisation of certain rights as IPRs. 93 OEMs could not submit before CCI sufficient evidence to
establish the former's claim over a particular type of IPRs. CCI observed that
OEMs did not provide the details of the spare parts corresponding to whatever
registration, done or pending, details were provided by them in relation to designs
and patents. CCI found it impossible to relate the rights claimed by the OEMs to
individual spare parts. Hence, the denial of the exemption seems valid from this
perspective.

91 See the proviso to Section 11 A (7) of the Patents Act 1970 mentioning the term 'patent holder'.

92 CCJ's only discretion, in this regard, is to acknowledge whether the said IPRs have already been

or may be conferred upon a person.
93

Supra note 6, at

20.6.16.
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XIV. TERRITORIAL NATURE OF IPRS
CCI noted that the OEMs contended that the some of the IPRs in question were validly held by their overseas parent companies and were transferred
through technology transfer agreements. Responding to this submission of
OEMs, CCI stated that the IPRs were territorial in nature and therefore, could
be vested upon the IPR holder only in a given jurisdiction. Though, on one hand,
this observation of CCI totally discarded the relevance of those IP-related international instruments which mandated the internationalisation of certain aspects
pertaining to IPRs, it also highlighted that the contracts could not make universal what is territorial in nature; especially, in the context of competition law that
specifically stressed on the need of the conferment of the IPRs as per the Indian
IP statutes. CCI observed that the OEMs held, under a TTA, the right to commercially exploit IPRs that was held by their parent companies and not the IPR
right itself.94 Therefore, also, the application of Section 3(5)(i) was denied by CCI.
If the Indian IP statutes provide for the recognition of IPRs vested upon
a person abroad, it will be mandatory for CCI to consider it favourably for the
purpose of application of Section 3(5)(i). CCI held that only the IPR enforcement
agencies in India, and not CCI, would be in a position to decide if an IPR registered abroad would fulfil the legal and technical requirements of the Indian IP
statutes to be considered as an IPR worthy of being the subject of Section 3(5)
(i). CCI, however, did, in theory and prospectively, usurp the jurisdiction if it had
evidence before itself with regard to the fact that the foreign-registered IPR in
question is validly recognized as per the Indian statutes or where such recognition was imminent.
XV. CEASE TO SUBSIST
CCI, while considering whether the OEMs enjoyed copyright protection even
after they did not register their engineering drawings and technical manuals of
their spare parts under the Section 2(0)9 5 of the Copyright Act 6 , held that the
copyright over the designs registered under the Designs Act 97 or the designs that
are capable of getting registered under the Design Act, but were not registered,
shall cease to exists once the said design has been applied more than 50 times by
the application of industrial process by the copyright holder or its licensee.98
CCI, in response to the contention of the OEMs that the provision of section 15(2) of the Copyright Act will be applicable to protect the copyright of the
OEMs in the spare parts because of the application of the International Copyright
94 Supra note 6, at 20.6.17.
15 Definition of 'literary work' under the Copyright Act.
96 Supra note 6, 20.6.18.
17 Designs Act, 2000.
98

Supra note 6,

20.6.19.
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Order, 1999 implementing the provisions of the Berne Convention, read with
the section 33 of the Copyright Act99 , held that the CCI didn't need to venture
into the applicability of section 15 of the Copyright Act to the case of the OEMs
in order to determine the applicability of section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act
to the agreements between OEMs and OESs. 00 CCI went ahead to interpret
"impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protection of any of his
rights" and held that the concept of protection of an IPR was qualified by the
word "necessary".'0'1This interpretation of CCI is not justified because it is not
the concept of the protection of an IPR that is qualified by the word 'necessary',
it is the reasonable conditions that ought to be 'necessary' for the protection
which is an independently absolute concept under Section 3(5)(i). On the basis
of its interpretation of the phrase, CCI stated: "So the question that one should
ask is: can the JPR holder be able to protect his JPR, even ifsuch restriction
was not present".,0 2 This question is also wrong because the phrase in the Section
does not read: "if necessary for the protection". Instead, the phrase is "as may be
necessary for protection". The protection is absolute in the context of the Section.
Therefore, the word 'necessary' doesn't qualify the word 'protection'; but, it does
qualify the phrase "impose reasonable conditions" and thus, qualifying the words
'reasonable' and 'conditions', collectively. So, the questions that CCI should have
considered are: Are the conditions that are sought to be imposed by the person
wanting to apply Section 3(5)(i) reasonable? And, Are the reasonable conditions
so imposed necessary for the protection of the IPRs?
XVI. PRODUCTS DID NOT COMPRISE THE IPRS
CCI observed that the products manufactured by OEMs and sold by the OESs
0 3
are finished products and the IPRs in them could be protected contractually.
Interestingly, this is what the OEMs were allegedly doing imposing restrictions
on sales to protect the IPRs; but, CCI failed to articulate it. According to CCI,
OEMs were not to impose sale conditions on the OESs to protect the IPRs in the
finished products. This observation of CCI is wrong for the reason that the scope
of Section 3(5)(i) does include such contracts and the issue before CCI was to
check the validity of such contracts that were imposing sale restrictions under the
pretext of protecting IPRs in the finished products.
CCI held that "selling a diagnostic tool in the open market does not comprise
the IPRs of the OEMs in such tools and equipment"' 04 Regardless of the fact that
the Section does, technically, include within its scope the scenario where the
sales restrictions can be imposed in order to protect IPRs, the handling of the
99 Supra note 6, at
10
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issue by the CCI is not understandable when it held that the restrictions imposed
upon the OESs from selling spare parts directly into the were not within the
ambit of exemptions granted by Section 3(5)(i). By the implication of the Section,
if an agreement causes protection of IPRs and anti-competitive behaviour, it will
still be allowed to get into effect.
XVII. CONCLUSION
The limited analysis of Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act in this article
clearly shows that the highly uncertain contours through which the competition
law has been framed are atrocious and unable to regulate the anti-competitive
exercise of IPRs. It also highlights certain faults in the CCI's interpretation of the
law. The aforementioned analysis also shows how skewed are the objectives of
the dynamics of the interface between competition law and IP law.
IPRs should not be used in a way that violates competition law.0 5 The provisions contained in the TRIPS also aim at preserving competition in the mar-7
ket. ' 6 Intellectual property rights have to take account of the public interest.
The judiciary has the responsibility to discharge the great burden of just interpretation of the law that has been formulated by law-makers and to analyse the new
dimensions.0 8
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